Latest Asylum Trends: Annual Analysis

Afghans

The increasingly repressive conditions in Afghanistan, particularly the systematic exclusion of women and girls from public life under Taliban rule, triggered the adoption of EUAA Country Guidance on Afghanistan in January 2023 (and updated May 2024), unanimously endorsed by EU+ countries. This guidance confirmed that Taliban-imposed restrictions amount to persecution. UNHCR also released guidance in 2023 supporting similar conclusions. These developments laid the groundwork for a ruling by the CJEU in October 2024, which confirmed that Taliban-imposed restrictions on women amount to persecution. As a result, Afghan women may qualify for refugee status solely based on their nationality and gender.

Since early 2025 and peaking over the summer, Afghan women, some of whom were previously granted subsidiary or national forms of protection, lodged more repeated applications in pursuit of full refugee status, which provides broader rights, including family reunification. As a result, there was a sharp increase in repeated Afghan applications, evidently women – first in Austria and later on a larger scale in Germany, despite a decline in ‘newly arrived’ first-time applicants. By the end of the 2025, Afghans had submitted 117,000 applications which is a one-third increase compared to 2024 though the total is broadly comparable with the number of applications lodged in 2023 and lower than in 2022.

This increase should not be interpreted as evidence of a more permissive asylum environment. On the contrary, in 2025 Germany revoked resettlement pledges for Afghans in Pakistan and resumed deportations of Afghan nationals with criminal records. Nevertheless, more positive decisions issued at first instance particularly to repeated applicants, pushed the overall recognition rate for Afghans up to 68% for EU-regulated protection (see section on Recognition Rates).

For an overview of the general situation in Afghanistan under Taliban rule, read the EUAA Country Focus 2026.

Venezuelans

Venezuela’s deepening political and economic crisis continued to drive large-scale displacement in 2025. Over 2.8 million Venezuelans remain in Colombia, 1.7 million in Peru, and hundreds of thousands more in Brazil, Chile and Ecuador. At the same time, changes to US migration policy further restricted access to international protection, while the removal of President Maduro introduced additional political uncertainty, even as elements of the former regime remained in place. Several Latin American countries also reintroduced or tightened visa requirements for Venezuelan nationals, narrowing mobility options across the region. In Colombia, many of the programmes previously designed to assist Venezuelan residents were dismantled in 2025. While some voluntary returns have occurred, large numbers remain stranded in host countries with limited access to protection or livelihoods.

In contrast, Spain has adopted a more open and integration-oriented approach. In 2024, it introduced a new immigration policy focused on employment, education and family reunification, supported by IOM. The plan reduced residency requirements and expanded job-seeker visa access to align with labour market and pension system needs. In early 2026, Spain announced plans to regularise the status of undocumented migrants—an initiative expected to benefit at least half a million people. Against this backdrop, Venezuelan asylum applications in the EU+ reached a record 91,000 in 2025 which represents a 23% increase over the previous year. Spain remained by far the main destination, receiving the vast majority of claims and continuing to grant humanitarian protection to applicants not qualifying for international protection. In fact, the majority of Venezuelans receive such national forms of protection as the recognition rate for EU-regulated types of protection is just 2%. Given tightening conditions elsewhere in the Americas and Spain’s comparatively supportive policies, it is unsurprising that growing numbers of Venezuelans view the EU+ as a more stable and accessible destination.

Syrians

The situation in Syria underwent a series of major developments in 2025. After Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) ousted Bashar al-Assad at the end of 2024, a transitional government was formed in March 2025. This shift prompted the EU and US to lift most sanctions and remove HTS from their respective terrorism lists. In October 2025, Syria held its first, albeit restrictive parliamentary elections, marking a symbolic milestone in the country’s long path to recovery. Despite these steps, Syria remains extremely fragile following over a decade of conflict and authoritarian rule. As of early 2026, a tense standoff between the transitional government and Kurdish-led forces in the northeast risks reigniting broader instability.

Reflecting these geopolitical shifts, Syrian asylum applications in the EU+ dropped significantly by 72% from 151,000 in 2024 to just 42,000 in 2025. During 2025, most EU+ countries temporarily paused the processing of Syrian asylum claims pending greater clarity on the evolving situation, though they continued to accept new applications. Notably, far fewer Syrians chose to apply for asylum, with some expressing cautious optimism about returning to rebuild their communities. As of January 2026, UNHCR estimates that 1.4 million Syrians have returned from abroad since the fall of Assad, primarily from neighbouring countries.

For updated analysis of the situation in Syria following the overthrow of Bashar Al-Assad, read two EUAA Syria Country Focus reports from July 2025. For an  in-depth analysis of the situation in Syria, focussing on the key elements of qualification for international protection, read EUAA’s Syria Country Guidance and an explanatory statement.

Bangladeshis

Bangladesh experienced profound political and social upheaval following the collapse of the former government in August 2024. Triggered by mass student protests against the reinstatement of a civil service quota system, the situation rapidly escalated into nationwide unrest. Violence peaked in what some observers described as the “July massacre,” during which state security forces and pro-government actors clashed with demonstrators, leaving an estimated 1,400 dead and thousands injured. In the face of mounting civilian resistance and a refusal by the military to open fire on protesters, former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fled the country. An interim government, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, was appointed with a mandate to guide Bangladesh toward democratic reform ahead of the next elections.

Despite initial stabilisation by late 2024, the country remained volatile throughout 2025. Law enforcement gaps persisted, contributing to a significant rise in violent crime, mob justice, and gender-based violence. The number of reported murders, robberies and abductions surged compared to previous years. In response, the interim government launched a joint military-police operation to curb lawlessness, but security remained tenuous. High-profile incidents of sexual violence, public lynchings and targeted attacks, often driven by political retribution or communal tensions, reinforced a climate of fear. Human rights monitors documented a sharp increase in deaths due to mob violence, with rates reaching decade-long highs. Although political institutions began rebuilding under interim leadership, the overall deterioration in law and order contributed to heightened protection concerns throughout the year. At the time of writing, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party won a landslide majority in first election since the uprising, promising sweeping constitutional reforms.

In 2025, Bangladeshis lodged 37,000 applications for asylum, down by 15% compared to 2024 but still ranking them fourth among all citizenships applying for asylum in the EU+. According to Frontex, Bangladeshis were also the citizenship most frequently detected illegally crossing the external border, especially in the Central Mediterranean. Click here for a comparison of asylum applications and detections at the border. The first instance recognition rate for Bangladeshis has remained low at just 3% (see section on Recognition Rates), and Bangladesh was included in the first EU list of safe countries of origin.

For an overview of human rights, security and socioeconomic under the interim government in Bangladesh read the EUAA Country Focus 2025.

Turks

Turkish asylum applications fell from more than 100,000 in 2023 to just 33,000 applications in 2025, placing Turkish nationals as the fifth-largest group among all asylum seekers in the EU+. Türkiye’s domestic climate remained repressive, with economic challenges and institutional decay continuing to shape outward mobility. These conditions contributed to surging applications in earlier years. However, applications halved in 2024 and fell further in 2025.

Analysts have linked the decline primarily to diminished pull factors, including stricter border controls along the Western Balkans Route and lower recognition rates (just 13% in 2025, see section on Recognition Rates) which might discourage potential applicants. Turkish media have likewise noted that many people leaving for predominantly economic reasons struggle to meet asylum criteria. Click here for a comparison of asylum applications and detections of illegal border crossing.

In sum, persistent pressure factors in Türkiye continue to act as viable push factors, but tighter border controls and reduced prospects of being granted protection might be deterring many from seeking asylum in the EU+. This interpretation is supported by a rise in the proportion of repeated applications, which increased from around 5% of all Turkish applications in 2023 to more than 20% in 2025, suggesting that a growing share of Turkish applicants are already present in the EU+ rather than newly arriving from their country of origin.

At the same time, Turkish nationals continue to pursue regular mobility channels in record numbers. In 2024, around one million Schengen visas were issued to Turkish citizens, mainly by Greece and Germany, indicating sustained outward mobility despite declining asylum applications.

In 2025, the EUAA and Türkiye renewed their commitment to strengthening Turkish asylum and reception systems in line with standards of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Read more in the Roadmap for Cooperation between the EUAA and Türkiye 2025–2028.

Visa-free Citizenships

In the past two years, around a quarter of all asylum applications in the EU+ are lodged by nationals of countries with visa-free access to the Schengen area, meaning they can arrive on flights legally and directly from their home countries. Spain tends to receive the largest share of such applications, with visa-free nationals usually accounting for around three quarters of its total inflow.

Venezuelans, Ukrainians and Colombians represent the majority of visa-free asylum applicants in the EU+: in 2025, Venezuelans lodged a record 91,000 applications, ranking second among all nationalities, while Ukrainians lodged 25,000 and Colombians 22,000.

In late 2025, the European Parliament approved a reform of the EU visa suspension mechanism covering the 61 countries whose nationals can currently travel visa-free to the Schengen area for short stays. The mechanism allows the European Commission to reintroduce visa requirements when there are security concerns, including substantial increases in unsuccessful asylum applications.

Repeated Applications

In 2025, repeated applications, those submitted in the same receiving country after a final decision on a previous application, increased to 15% of all asylum applications in the EU+. This share typically hovers around 10%, but in 2025 it was driven markedly higher by a surge in repeated applications from Afghan women following updated legal and policy guidance.

Indeed, among Afghan applicants in 2025, 41% of all applications were repeated, up sharply from 14% in the previous year. Other nationalities with a high proportion of repeated applications included Haitians (45%), Turks (21%), and Guineans and Iraqis (19%). In contrast, several citizenships recorded very low levels of repeated applications, likely indicating that they had newly arrived in the receiving country, most notably Peruvians (1%), Venezuelans (2%), Sudanese (3%), Colombians and Bangladeshis (4%), and Syrians (6%).

Repeated applications also tended to be geographically concentrated. Almost all repeated applications by Afghans were lodged in Germany, while the majority of repeated applications by Haitians and Guineans were lodged in France.