Latest Asylum Trends: Annual Analysis

Syria’s political turnaround was a crucial factor underpinning the overall decline in EU+ asylum applications. The December 2024 ousting of Bashar al-Assad and the establishment of a transitional government marked a decisive shift after years of protracted conflict. Through much of 2025, Syria experienced an uneasy pause in major hostilities, which had a sizable impact on EU+ asylum trends.

In 2025, Syrian applications in the EU+ dropped sharply to around 42,000, representing a 72% year-on-year decline. Syrians also fell from the top rank of EU+ asylum seekers. They were much less frequently detected at the external border, further illustrating the scale of the shift in mobility patterns.

One year into the transition, UNHCR recorded the return of over 1.4 million Syrians from abroad (mostly neighbouring countries) and welcomed voluntary returns as part of Syria’s reconstruction, while stressing that there should be no forced returns of refugees. Many Syrians appear to have adopted a wait-and-see approach, postponing onward movement while assessing whether conditions would stabilise.

However, hopes for sustained peace have already been tested. The renewal of conflict in parts of Syria is challenging earlier assumptions about large-scale return and long-term stability. While Syria’s transitional government has advocated for refugee repatriation and reconstruction, prompting some EU+ countries and Agencies to explore repatriation arrangements, escalating violence in certain areas raises renewed protection concerns. Many Syrians abroad remain fearful that return could expose them to risk, particularly minorities and individuals associated with former opposition groups.

The sharp decline in Syrian applications therefore reflects a temporary geopolitical shift rather than a definitive resolution of displacement drivers. However, the political changes in Syria have resulted in changes of profiles in need of international protection. For updated analysis of the situation in Syria following the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, read EUAA Syria Country Focus report from July 2025. For an analysis of key profiles, read EUAA’s Syria Country Guidance and its explanatory statement .

While the Syrian decline was driven primarily by developments within Syria, the 2025 shift in Afghan applications originated largely within the EU+ legal space.

Legal developments within the EU+ can shape asylum trends by harmonising and clarifying protection thresholds. In October 2024, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) altered the protection landscape for Afghan women, holding that they face a general risk of persecution under Taliban rule. Nationality and gender alone were deemed sufficient grounds for granting refugee status. Afghan women and girls were thus recognised as a particular social group at acute risk, in light of the Taliban’s systematic oppression — described by the European Parliament as gender apartheid. These developments built on EUAA Country Guidance, which had emphasised that the systematic exclusion of women and girls from public life in Afghanistan could amount to persecution. UNHCR issued guidance supporting similar conclusions.

In 2025, these legal clarifications triggered a surge in repeated applications by Afghan women and their families already present in the EU+. Indeed, of all applications lodged by Afghans in 2025, 42% were by repeats, up sharply from 14% the previous year. Crucially, this increase was not matched by a rise in detections at the EU’s external borders and instead, reflected re-applications by persons already inside the EU. Furthermore, although it coincided in time with reports of Iran stepping up returns of Afghan nationals, the rise in EU+ applications was not linked to onward movements of Afghans expelled from Iran.

The surge was concentrated in Germany, where authorities reported a sharp rise in Afghan women’s asylum claims in mid-2025, noting that nearly half were repeated applications. On a smaller scale, there was an increase in Austria in the first half of 2025.

Against this backdrop, many EU+ countries are pushing for increased deportations of Afghans who are residing illegally in the EU+, either voluntarily or by force. The UN urges that returns to Afghanistan should be voluntary, safe, dignified and consistent with international law.

By mid-2025, Venezuelan nationals had become the second largest asylum-seeking group in the EU+. By the end of the year, approximately 91,000 Venezuelans had applied for asylum in the EU+, the highest level ever recorded and a 23% increase compared to 2024. Nearly all claims were lodged in Spain.

This sustained inflow reflects the interaction of external crisis and mobility opportunities. Venezuela remains mired in severe economic and political turmoil, marked by hyperinflation and the displacement of more than 7.9 million citizens since 2014. At the same time, several neighbouring Latin American countries tightened visa requirements for Venezuelans, narrowing mobility options within the region.

The United States adopted a markedly tougher stance toward Venezuelan nationals in 2025. Many who had benefited from Temporary Protected Status or other relief measures were treated as immigration violators and pressured to leave. In early 2026, US forces captured Maduro and removed him from power, an event Washington framed as opening the door to democratic transition. However, the regime remains largely intact and the trajectory remains uncertain.

Against this backdrop, Spain’s position stands in sharp contrast. Venezuelans can enter the Schengen area visa-free for short stays, allowing many to travel legally to Spain and subsequently apply for asylum. Spain has also pursued flexible migration policies to address labour shortages and demographic ageing, including humanitarian permits and regularisation pathways available for Latin American nationals. Venezuelans who do not qualify for asylum are often granted humanitarian status permitting residence and work. See the EUAA National Asylum Developments Database for more information.

At EU level, political agreement was reached at the end of 2025 on the aligned use of safe countries of origin and safe third country concepts, enabling more applications to be declared inadmissible and accelerating border and return procedures. The reforms aim to facilitate faster rejection of claims deemed unlikely to succeed and to strengthen the link between asylum and return policy.

At national level, several EU+ countries implemented or reinforced restrictive asylum-related measures in 2025, including more restrictive asylum measures adopted in Czechia and the Netherlands, the facilitation of deportations in Germany and other EU+ countries,  temporary suspension of family reunification in Austria and Germany (for subsidiary protection holders only),  discouraging information campaigns for migrants in countries of origin and transit in Belgium, and the extension of internal border controls in relation to irregular migration concerns in 9 countries.

In November 2025, the European Commission published the first European Annual Asylum and Migration Report, marking the launch of the Pact’s annual migration management cycle. The report confirmed a broad easing of pressure on EU+ asylum systems until mid-2025, while highlighting that the decline was driven primarily by fewer irregular border crossings and the sharp reduction in Syrian applications. At the same time, it underscored that asylum pressure remained unevenly distributed.

While restrictive measures sought to limit irregular migration and facilitate returns, several EU+ countries simultaneously adopted pragmatic approaches to address acute labour shortages and demographic decline. Ageing populations and shrinking workforces increasingly influenced policy development, even where political rhetoric remained focused on deterrence. A recent report from MPI highlights several initiatives to employ refugees across the EU. 

Spain provides a clear example of this dual dynamic. It ended 2025 with a record 3.1 million foreign nationals contributing to social security — approximately 14% of its employed workforce. Migrants have added over 800,000 workers since 2021, helping to ease demographic pressures. Displaced Venezuelans, many of whom may have been issued negative asylum decisions, accounted for more than 40,000 new social-security registrations in 2025 alone. Spain has framed legal migration as essential to counter demographic decline and sustain economic growth, combining humanitarian concern with economic pragmatism.

Greece illustrates a more enforcement-oriented variant of the labour–migration nexus. Legislation expected to pass in early 2026 would streamline the recruitment of tens of thousands of workers from countries such as India, Bangladesh and Egypt to address acute shortages in tourism, construction and agriculture, including through fast-track procedures for major projects. At the same time, the bill explicitly excludes migrants who entered irregularly from any pathway to legal status and strengthens penalties for irregular entry and assistance. Unlike Spain’s broader regularisation of irregular residents, Greece’s approach combines expanded external labour recruitment with a hardline stance towards irregular migration.

The labour market impact of displaced Ukrainians under temporary protection further demonstrates this dynamic. Nearly one million displaced Ukrainians are currently hosted in Poland; back in 2024 three quarters of them had entered the workforce, contributing an estimated 2–3% to GDP growth in 2024. Similar benefits have been reported in Czechia, where Ukrainians constitute one of the largest per capita labour market additions in recent years. In Germany, where over 1.2 million displaced Ukrainians are hosted, employment rates have steadily increased as integration barriers are addressed.

Another key component of the EU’s migration strategy in 2025 was the strengthening of bilateral and regional cooperation with countries of departure and transit. These efforts aimed to manage mixed migration flows, reduce irregular crossings and address root causes.

Spain and Morocco intensified operational coordination on border management and maritime surveillance. This coincided with a sharp reduction in irregular migration along the Western African route, where detections fell by 63%. Departures from Morocco declined by 17%, in contrast to increased departures from neighbouring Algeria.

In the Central Mediterranean, Italy renewed its Memorandum of Understanding with Libya, supporting the Libyan coastguard in intercepting irregular departures. The arrangement continues to attract criticism regarding so-called pull-backs and the treatment of migrants returned to Libya. Italy also signed a new agreement with Türkiye in 2025 to expand joint coastguard operations and intelligence sharing aimed at countering smuggling networks.

Along the Western Balkans route, detections fell by 42%, supported by reinforced controls and the launch of a new Frontex joint operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in November 2025. This built on existing agreements with Moldova, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Serbia.

Beyond operational cooperation, wider EU-level partnerships combined border management with economic and governance engagement. The EU and Jordan consolidated a Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership in 2025, covering migration cooperation and refugee support. The EU–Mauritania partnership, launched in 2024, became operational in 2025 with actions spanning border support, anti-smuggling cooperation, legal mobility and economic development. Toward the end of the year, the Pact for the Mediterranean was also launched with the aim of reshaping the EU’s relationship with neighbouring countries through a broader focus on job creation and economic partnerships, alongside migration management.

Despite the relative easing of pressure on EU+ asylum systems in 2025, global displacement dynamics remained volatile. In mid-2025, UNHCR reported a slight overall decline in global displacement, driven primarily by return movements in a limited number of countries such as Syria, rather than by any broader easing of conflict or instability.

At the same time, 2025 as a whole was characterised by a dramatic contraction in global humanitarian funding, which fell by approximately 30% compared with the previous year. The closure of major aid programmes and the scaling back of US-funded development and humanitarian initiatives across multiple regions reduced support for fragile states and displacement-affected populations.

UNHCR reported a sharp contraction in its funding, resulting in the closure of numerous offices worldwide and the loss of approximately 3,500 permanent staff positions, alongside hundreds of temporary posts. These reductions translated into significant operational cutbacks, constraining the agency’s capacity to respond to emergencies and leaving millions of displaced people at heightened risk. IOM likewise reported substantial funding shortfalls with severe repercussions for vulnerable migrant communities.

While this humanitarian funding shock did not yet materialise as a measurable driver of increased asylum applications to the EU+ in 2025, it constitutes a major structural risk factor for 2026 and beyond. Reduced regional protection capacity, diminished assistance and weakened registration systems in neighbouring countries of first asylum could accelerate onward movements to the EU in the event of renewed instability.

One potential flashpoint is Iran, recently the second largest refugee hosting country in the world,  which entered 2026 engulfed in nationwide unrest linked to economic collapse and political repression. The Iranian regime faces sustained domestic pressure alongside heightened international tensions. In 2025, the US and Israel conducted strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, further destabilising an already fragile situation.

Although Iranian displacement has so far remained limited (just 8,000 applications for asylum in the EU+ in 2025, ranked 31st), the scale of potential risk is significant. With a population of approximately 90 million, even partial destabilisation could generate refugee movements of an unprecedented magnitude. Displacement of just 10% of Iran’s population would rival the largest refugee flows of recent decades. While such a scenario remains highly speculative, and is tied to the use of Türkiye as a transit country, observers increasingly view Iran’s turmoil as a major and long-term risk, for which the outlook remains highly uncertain.

More broadly, the contraction of humanitarian funding described above compounds these geopolitical risks. The reduction in protection and assistance capacity in regions of origin and first asylum could accelerate onward movement should new crises erupt. In this sense, the humanitarian funding shock of 2025 functions less as an immediate driver and more as a risk multiplier for future instability.

Against this uncertain external environment, the EU+ is entering a period of institutional reform. Most of the measures in the Pact on Migration and Asylum are scheduled to enter into application in mid-2026 following years of negotiation and adoption in 2024. The Pact introduces an obligatory border screening process, new procedures intended to accelerate decisions on certain categories of applications, a system of solidarity contributions among Member States, and enhanced international cooperations.

It also aligns with new digital border management systems expected to become operational in 2026, including the Entry/Exit System (EES) and the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS). Together, these measures aim to strengthen external border management and enhance coordination across the EU+ asylum and migration systems.

The implementation of the Pact marks a shift toward a more institutionalised and collectively managed migration and asylum framework. It aims at delivering greater predictability and strengthening resilience against systemic shocks due to, inter alia, changes in the surrounding geopolitical environment.

EU+ asylum authorities enter 2026 with applications at a relative lull, underpinned by the sharp decline in Syrian claims, along with other decreases and the absence of new large-scale inflows. However, this breathing space rests on contingent developments rather than on any meaningful resolution of displacement drivers.

Shrinking workforces and demographic decline have begun to shape migration policy choices in some EU+ countries, even as political discourse favours restriction. Cooperation with countries of origin and departure may have contributed to fewer detections at the external border, while legal harmonisation temporarily reshaped protection demand within the EU+. At the same time, geopolitical volatility and dramatic budget cuts introduce new layers of uncertainty.

The decline observed in 2025 therefore reflects a temporary convergence of factors rather than a definitive turning point. A renewed escalation in conflict, regional destabilisation or systemic crisis could rapidly alter the trajectory of asylum applications in the EU+.

As the Pact enters into force, the EU+ seeks to institutionalise a more coordinated and controlled response to migration pressures. Its effectiveness will be tested against a backdrop of highly unpredictable geopolitical shifts and constrained humanitarian capacity. The only certainty heading into 2026 is that migration and asylum will remain central to EU policy and international cooperation in the year ahead.