

**Please cite as:** EUAA, '1.1.4. Security trends and civilian deaths estimates' in *Sudan: Security Situation*, October 2026.

# 1.1.4. Security trends and civilian deaths estimates

It is difficult to determine the number of people in Sudan who have died during the current war,[136] including as a result of violence, starvation, or lack of healthcare in the context of the conflict.[137] Available data is sparse and its gathering has been described as 'methodologically weak', including due to restrictions in access to affected communities.[138]

The ongoing conflict has severely impeded news gathering.[139] Media infrastructure has been destroyed and internet and telecommunications networks have been affected by frequent disruptions.[140] Journalists have been targeted by both warring parties for reporting on atrocities[141] and humanitarian conditions.[142] In addition, propaganda and disinformation have dominated the already tenuous information space, with both the SAF and the RSF using distortion of information and omission of key facts as media strategies.[143] In particular, independent reporting in El Fasher was near-impossible during the siege and hostilities.[144] International media coverage of the conflict has similarly remained limited[145] as foreign journalists have faced significant difficulties entering Sudan due to security concerns[146] and logistical challenges.[147] For more information, see section 1.3.3. Access to information, misinformation and media landscape and section 2.3.2. Situation of journalists and other media personnel of the EUAA COI report Sudan: Country Focus (August 2026).

Estimates of the death toll from the conflict varied widely[148] as the mortality impact of the war remained 'largely unmeasured', according to the Sudan Research Group of the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (LSHTM).[149] In August 2025, Tom Perriello, the US government's former special envoy for Sudan, estimated that the overall number of deaths had exceeded 400 000, without providing any further details for this estimate.[150]

The OHCHR reported at least 3 384 conflict-related civilian deaths[151] between January and June 2025, representing almost 80 % of all civilian deaths (4 238) documented over the entire year 2024.[152] During the one-year period from 16 November 2024 to 15 November 2025, the OHCHR recorded at least 5 359 civilian deaths. Of these, at least 3 700 occurred during the direct conduct of hostilities, including 1 977 in the Darfur region (with North Darfur state accounting for 1 825) and 932 in the Kordofan region.[153] The OHCHR noted that its casualty figures represented 'an under-reporting of the true scale of civilian deaths arising from the conflict'.[154] Due to limited access to conflict areas, OHCHR has predominantly relied on remote monitoring and interviewing to gather data.[155]

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED recorded 4 893 security incidents at national level. Of these, 1 437 were coded as battles,156 2 031 as explosions/remote violence and 1 425 as violence against civilians. Overall, the number of incidents decreased from 437 in March 2025 to below 400 in April and May 2025 and below 300 in June 2025. Monthly incident numbers subsequently remained between 200 and 300 until June 2026. In July 2026, the number of incidents rose again to 349 before decreasing to 258 in August 2026.157

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**Figure 1: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Sudan, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data**158

During the reference period (1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026), ACLED recorded security incidents in all states of Sudan. The highest numbers of incidents were recorded in North Kordofan (910), North Darfur (876), West Kordofan (632) and South Kordofan states (606), while the lowest numbers were recorded in the states of Sennar (14), Gedaref (16), Kassala (22), and Red Sea (34). Of the 1 425 incidents coded as 'violence against civilians', which resulted in 4 690 recorded fatalities, 888 incidents involved the RSF, 208 the Darfur communal militia, and 82 the military forces of Sudan, including Military Intelligence.159

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**Figure 2: Security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians by region in Sudan, 1 March 2025 - 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data**160

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED recorded a total of 21 863 fatalities across the country, including both combatants and civilians.161 However, such figures are likely to be lower than the actual total number of overall conflict-related fatalities given the fact that ACLED's recorded numbers represent a minimum count of reported deaths that have immediately resulted from a specific security incident. The numbers thus do not include indirect conflict-related deaths. Moreover, ACLED states that its data may have been affected by underreporting due to access constraints, insecurity, and disruptions in communications.162

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Figure 3: Fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Sudan, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data163

Data on civilian casualties attributable solely to the use of explosive weapons have been provided by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV).164 AOAV's data is based on English-language media reports that contain explicitly stated casualty figures. In its methodology, AOAV explains that, where several media sources report on the same incident, those providing the greatest level of detail or the most recent casualty data are selected. AOAV acknowledges several limitations, often related to the quality and reliability of the source material and the lack of a mechanism of following up media reports with in-depth investigation.165

Between March 2025 and June 2026, AOAV recorded 3 394 civilian fatalities among a total of 6 335 civilian casualties linked to explosive weapons use. The number of civilian deaths was highest in the months of April 2025 (456 fatalities), December 2025 (341), and March 2026 (334) and lowest in July 2025 (82), August 2025 (109), and June 2026 (114).166 According to an estimate by the OHCHR, more than 1 000 civilian deaths had resulted from drone strikes between January and May 2026.167 By May 2026, attacks by armed drones, by a large margin, had become the primary cause of civilian fatalities in the country.168

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