



1.7.3. Telecommunications and cybersurveillance

DFRLab indicated that the interception of telecommunications is considered the 'most intrusive component' of the state's surveillance apparatus.^{[347](#)} CANTV, the state-run telecommunications provider, is reportedly used by authorities to monitor targets of interest, facilitated by the lack of judicial oversight and the subordination of the justice system to the executive, which eases the issuance of interception orders.^{[348](#)} In 2021, telephone company Telefónica reported more than 1.5 million communication interceptions, which observers described as evidence of 'mass surveillance' by authorities.^{[349](#)} Reports also described instances in which state security agents detained citizens to inspect the contents of their mobile phones, including photos, social-media accounts, and private chats.^{[350](#)} CONATEL was likewise accused of monitoring communications and internet traffic, including activity on social-media platforms and messaging applications.^{[351](#)}

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DFRLab, Los vigilantes en la mira: Tecnologías de vigilancia para el control político en Venezuela, March 2026, [url](#), p. 5

- [348](#)

DFRLab, Los vigilantes en la mira: Tecnologías de vigilancia para el control político en Venezuela, March 2026, [url](#), p. 5

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AFP, "Vigilancia masiva" en Venezuela: más de un millón de teléfonos "pinchados", 24 June 2022, [url](#); DFRLab, Los vigilantes en la mira: Tecnologías de vigilancia para el control político en Venezuela, March 2026, [url](#), p. 5

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Freedom House, Carta abierta sobre la violencia política posibilitada por la tecnología en Venezuela, 6 August 2024, [url](#)

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Freedom House, Carta abierta sobre la violencia política posibilitada por la tecnología en Venezuela, 6 August 2024, [url](#)