



3.2.13. Balochistan nationalist groups

According to Balochistan's Chief Minister Sarfraz Bugti, an estimated 4 000 to 5 000 Baloch separatists were active across the Balochistan province.⁴⁵³ These movements were fuelled by repressive state conduct and local perceptions of the continued marginalisation of the population and economic exploitation of the province's resources by the government⁴⁵⁴ and through projects launched as part of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initiative.⁴⁵⁵ As of April 2025, the Baloch insurgency encompassed around 10 militant factions, with the Balochistan Liberation Army Jeeyand faction (BLA-J), the BLA Azad faction (BLA-A) and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) regularly claiming responsibility for attacks. The Baloch Raji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS) organisation, formed in 2018,⁴⁵⁶ continued to act as a platform for Baloch and Sindhi militant groups to coordinate attacks in Balochistan and Sindh. It currently comprises the BLA-J, the BLF, the Baloch Republican Guard (BRG), and the Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA).⁴⁵⁷

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Map 4: BLA activities in Pakistan between 1 November 2024 and 21 April 2026⁴⁵⁸

Please note: The depictions on Map 4 do not imply any opinion whatsoever on the part of EUAA concerning legal status or effective control over any country, territory, city, or area. Every effort is made to ensure this map is free of errors, but there is no guarantee that the map or its features are either spatially or temporally accurate or fit for a particular use. This map is provided without any warranty of any kind whatsoever, either expressed or implied.

Baloch nationalist groups have targeted security forces, infrastructure, and foreign investments,⁴⁵⁹ as well as non-Baloch workers and settlers, especially ethnic Punjabis.⁴⁶⁰ Sources referred to the BLA-J faction as the most active⁴⁶¹ and lethal insurgent group in Balochistan in 2025. It seeks Baloch independence through armed struggle and operates as a decentralised network with cells spread across Balochistan.⁴⁶² The group runs four special forces units,⁴⁶³ including the suicide unit Majeed Brigade and the Fatah Squad, as well as media and intelligence cells.⁴⁶⁴ Its operational focus lies on mobile and hit-and-run tactics, including suicide car bombings, IED attacks, ambushes, and blockades.⁴⁶⁵ Its targets include security forces,⁴⁶⁶ infrastructure, Chinese investments,⁴⁶⁷ and civilians in Balochistan, including off-duty security personnel⁴⁶⁸ and individuals travelling to Punjab.⁴⁶⁹ The Majeed Brigade has expanded its ranks to include female fighters.⁴⁷⁰ Amongst others, the deadly hijacking of the Jaffar Express train by BLA-J in March 2025⁴⁷¹ indicated an increase in the group's operational capabilities.⁴⁷²

The BLA-A faction, traditionally weaker than BLA-J and BLF,[473](#) operates a loose network of Baloch fighters under its exiled leader Hyrbyair Marri. During the reference period, it showed signs of a resurgence after having been relatively dormant since 2016, conducting its first suicide bombing, as well as low-profile bombings and ambushes. It also executed alleged state collaborators and security force members.[474](#)

The BLF concentrated on guerilla warfare, operating cells in central and southern Balochistan. In a new tactical development, its leader Allah Nazar Baloch allowed suicide attacks and included women fighters. A first suicide attack by the group, carried out by a woman, targeted a Frontier Corps (FC) headquarters.[475](#) For further information on Balochi nationalist groups, including background information, see section 3.1.6. Balochistan nationalist groups of the EUAA COI report Pakistan - Country Focus (December 2024).

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