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## 4.9.4. Alawites

COMMON ANALYSIS | Last update: December 2025

This profile should be read in conjunction with [4.1. Persons associated with the former Government of Syria](#).

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports and query: [COI Update](#), 5.; [Country Focus July 2025](#), [1.3.1.](#), [2.4.2.](#); [Country Focus March 2025](#), [1.3.2.](#); [Targeting 2020](#), 10.6.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Alawites represent around 1.7 million individuals or 9 % of Syria's population. They are primarily residing in the coastal and mountainous hinterlands (Tartous and Latakia governorates), with smaller communities living in the governorates of Homs, Hama and Damascus.

### Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution?

**Some acts to which Alawites could be exposed are of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution** such as extrajudicial killings, execution, revenge killings, torture, abductions.

More precisely, since early 2025, there are weekly reports of Alawites being victims of acts of retribution or revenge killings by unknown persons. Most of these incidents occurred in areas predominantly inhabited by Alawites. Not only Alawites actually linked to the former Assad regime's security apparatus have been targeted. There are reported killings of Alawites based on sectarian identity, driven by the conception that all Alawites were complicit in the Assad regime's actions. From 6 to 10 March 2025, clashes between the General Security Services (GSS) of [the Transitional Government](#) and their affiliates (mainly [the Syrian National Army \(SNA\)](#) factions) on one side and pro-Assad remnants on the other side, resulted in civilian deaths in Latakia and Tartous governorates, and to a lesser extent in Homs and Hama. Field executions and mass killings resulted in over 1 000 deaths of Alawite civilians most of whom were killed by SNA factions. Sporadic reports of attacks by the Transitional Government forces and affiliated armed groups against Alawites and killings of Alawites continue to emerge in the aftermath of this violence. Reports of attacks by unidentified armed individuals and groups against Alawites continued. Also, *Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah* Sunni militia claimed several attacks and killings of Alawites.

**The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts to which Alawites could be subjected to and whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should also be**

**considered.** More precisely, Alawites were largely represented within the Assad government, where they held key military, intelligence and security positions. [The Transitional Government's](#) layoffs have disproportionately affected Alawites reflecting both their overrepresentation in government employment under Assad and targeted sectarian measures. They remain largely excluded from the new political and military structures. Forced evictions and confiscations of land have also been reported.

## Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?

**The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for Alawites to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, including the facts and circumstances in the relevant areas at the time of the decision, such as:**

- **(Perceived) political background:** (perceived) association with the Assad government and/or an (imputed) oppositional stance towards the Transitional Government heighten the risk. See also [4.1. Persons associated with the former Government of Syria](#).
- **Home area:** sectarian-motivated assassinations of Alawites have been particularly notable in areas under the control of the Transitional Government such as Latakia, Hama, Homs, and Tartous governorates. As a consequence, Alawites from those governorates face a higher risk.

## Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, this is highly likely to be for **reasons of (imputed) political opinion** as the mere fact of being Alawite could lead to an imputed affiliation to the Assad government. Persecution of Alawites may also be for reasons of **religion**.



Exclusion considerations could be particularly relevant for Alawites associated with the Assad government; refer to [4.1. Persons associated with the former Government of Syria](#).