Latest Asylum Trends: Mid-Year Review 2026

Legal developments within the EU+ can shape asylum trends by harmonising and clarifying protection thresholds. In October 2024, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) altered the protection landscape for Afghan women, holding that they face a general risk of persecution under Taliban rule. Nationality and gender alone were deemed sufficient grounds for granting refugee status. Afghan women and girls were thus recognised as a particular social group at acute risk, in light of the Taliban’s systematic oppression — described by the European Parliament as gender apartheid.

EUAA Country Guidance in 2024 (updated in 2026) concluded that the cumulative restrictions imposed on women and girls under Taliban rule amount to persecution, while UNHCR issued guidance reaching similar conclusions. 

During 2025, this legal clarification prompted many Afghan women already living in the EU+—including some previously granted subsidiary or national protection—to lodge repeated applications seeking refugee status, which provides broader rights, including in relation to family reunification. The resulting increase was concentrated principally in Germany and, on a smaller scale, Austria and France, while first-time applications continued to decline.

By the first half of 2026, however, both first-time and repeated applications were declining, indicating that the earlier rise had largely run its course rather than developed into a sustained upward trend. During the first half of 2026, Afghans lodged around 39,000 applications, 7% fewer than in the same period in 2025. According to Frontex, during the first half of 2026 Afghans were also the most detected nationality in illegal border-crossings on the Eastern Mediterranean route, but overall, detections at the border were much lower than applications for asylum and did not increase during the peak of repeated applications in 2025. 

Against this backdrop, the EU and several EU+ countries continued to pursue the return of Afghan nationals without a right to remain, while the wider regional context was marked by much larger return movements from countries neighbouring Afghanistan. From the onset of the Middle East crisis to 4 July 2026, approximately 269,000 Afghans are said to have returned from Iran to Afghanistan, with deportations accounting for around 79% of these movements. Between 1 March and 10 August 2026, IOM recorded around 662,000 movements from Iran into Afghanistan, compared with around 305,000 movements in the opposite direction, reflecting substantial return and circular cross-border mobility between the two countries. According to UNHCR, many Afghan returns from Iran and Pakistan were driven by pressure rather than informed choice, with returnees reporting risks including arrest, detention, deportation, harassment, loss of assets and limited support after arrival. UNHCR continued to underline that many Afghans may require international protection, particularly women and girls, and that returns should take place voluntarily, safely and with dignity.

For more information see the EUAA Country Guidance: Afghanistan, a UNHCR trends report on Afghan applications in the EU+, an IOM Emergency Border Response report, and a UNAMA Update on the human rights situation in Afghanistan.
 

Around 8 million Venezuelans have fled the country since President Maduro took power in 2013, as the country experienced economic mayhem, hyperinflation, hunger and increasingly authoritarian rule. According to UNHCR, this is the largest exodus in Latin America’s recent history and one of the largest displacement crises in the world.

Venezuelans remained one of the largest applicant groups in the EU+ during the first half of 2026, although applications declined from late 2025, falling from around 8,300 applications in October 2025 to just 2,400 in June 2026.

Spain continued to dominate this flow, recently receiving around 90% of all Venezuelan applications, reflecting visa-free access to the Schengen area, a shared language, established diaspora networks and Spain’s longstanding practice of granting national humanitarian protection to many Venezuelans who did not qualify for EU-regulated protection.

The external context changed sharply when United States forces captured Nicolás Maduro in January 2026, but the existing governing structures largely remained in place under acting President Delcy Rodríguez and the prospects for a genuine democratic transition stayed uncertain. The humanitarian and socioeconomic situation also remained severe, with around 7.9 million people estimated to require humanitarian assistance and more than half of the population living in extreme poverty. This was exacerbated further by the earthquakes in late June 2026.

Spain’s migration policy also offered an important alternative pathway to legal status through an extraordinary regularisation process for migrants already living in the country before 31 December 2025. By the end of the application period, around 1.17 million regularisation applications had been received, including a substantial number from applicants for international protection. By providing an alternative pathway to legal residence and employment, the scheme may have reduced the need for some Venezuelans already in Spain to rely on the asylum procedure, potentially contributing to the decline in Venezuelan asylum applications during the first half of 2026.

For more information read the EUAA Country of Origin Report on Venezuela and the EUAA Query Response on Treatment of Venezuelan Returnees. 

Syria’s political transition continued to underpin the sharp decline in Syrian applications in the EU+, but developments during the first half of 2026 showed that the displacement crisis was far from resolved. The fall of the Assad government in December 2024 was followed by large-scale refugee and internally displaced person returns, greater institutional stability and somewhat improved humanitarian access, creating cautious optimism about recovery. More than 315,000 refugees returned to Syria during the first four months of 2026, following the return of over 3.4 million refugees and internally displaced people during 2025.

The scale of return should not, however, be interpreted as evidence that conditions had become uniformly safe or that Syria’s displacement crisis had been resolved. Field research by the International Rescue Committee found that returns were taking place faster than housing, essential services and livelihood opportunities could be restored. This dynamic became particularly visible following the escalation of hostilities in Lebanon in March 2026. More than 400,000 people crossed from Lebanon into Syria during the initial phase of the crisis, but only 27% indicated that they intended to remain permanently. By 10 August, IOM DTM Syria had recorded around 656,000 movements from Lebanon into Syria, 98% involving Syrian nationals, although changes in population coverage, sources and methodology mean that the latest figure is not directly comparable with earlier estimates. 

Conditions within Syria also remained highly uneven. The UN Commission of Inquiry continued to document executions, torture, gender-based violence, destruction of homes and other serious violations, including violence affecting minority communities. The continuing insecurity and uneven reach of state protection meant that the transition altered the profiles potentially requiring protection rather than eliminating protection needs altogether. 

Humanitarian and economic conditions also remained severe, with an estimated 15.6 million people requiring humanitarian assistance in 2026, including more than 5.5 million internally displaced people. Extensive damage to housing, infrastructure and public services continued to constrain sustainable return and reintegration. 

The decline in Syrian applications in the EU+ should therefore be interpreted as part of a major but still fragile political and regional adjustment. Large-scale returns and reduced onward movement have substantially changed Syrian asylum trends, but insecurity, damaged infrastructure, limited livelihoods and displacement from neighbouring countries continue to generate protection risks and the possibility of renewed movement.

For more information read EUAA COI Reports: Security Situation and Country Focus, as well as UNHCR Returns to Syria, Regional Update.

Bangladesh has been one of the top applicant countries for some time, but it became particularly relevant to EU+ asylum trends in 2026 because it was included in the first common EU list of safe countries of origin, which began applying with the Asylum Procedure Regulation on 12 June. The designation means applications by Bangladeshi nationals would mainly be examined through the accelerated procedure or may be examined under the border procedure if certain criteria are met, while preserving individual assessment where applicants demonstrate specific protection risks.

Bangladeshi applications were overwhelmingly of first-time claims, with repeated applications accounting for only around 4% between January and June 2026. Recognition rates were consistently very low, with only around 2–3% of first instance decisions granting refugee status or subsidiary protection.

Italy was by far the principal destination for Bangladeshi applicants, followed by Greece and France. This pattern was consistent with IOM data showing that in 2025 some 83% of all Bangladeshi arrivals had entered via Italy, with most identifying Italy as their intended destination. According to Frontex, Bangladeshis were the most frequently detected nationality on the Central Mediterranean route in the first half of 2026, but asylum applications still far exceeded detections at the border. 

Taken together, the very low recognition rate, predominance of first-time applications and concentration in Italy suggest that the asylum trend is closely connected to established mixed-migration, including labour-migration routes, while the low share of repeated applications suggests that asylum trends cannot be explained mainly by people already present in the receiving country re-entering the asylum procedure. 

The first months of Pact implementation will show whether the safe-country designation reduces processing times and pending caseloads for Bangladeshi claims. It is likely to affect the procedural treatment of applications but the economic incentives and established migration patterns are likely to remain. However, in May 2026 Bangladesh and Italy signed a Memorandum of Understanding, aimed at combatting irregular migration, addressing labour shortages, and promoting safe, orderly and regular migration. 

For more information read EUAA COI Report and Mixed Migration Centre (MMC) report on Bangladeshi migration to Italy. 

The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum entered into application on 12 June 2026, following extensive legal and operational preparations across EU+ countries. The Asylum Report 2026 provides a comprehensive account of developments in asylum policy, legislation and practice during 2025, including preparations for Pact implementation. Rather than repeat that broader assessment, this section highlights only those policy developments most directly relevant to interpreting asylum trends in the first half of 2026.

Comprising 10 interlinked legislative acts, the Pact substantially revises the common framework for asylum procedures, border management, responsibility and solidarity, with the broader aim of managing applications more efficiently while preserving processing capacity for people with evident protection needs. 

One of the most consequential changes concerns the processing asylum applications considered less likely to result in international protection. For example, the first EU-wide list of safe countries of origin includes Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, India, Kosovo, Morocco and Tunisia, as well as accession candidate countries unless specified exclusions apply. Applications from these countries (with the exception of Ukraine) could be examined more quickly through the accelerated procedure or may also be handled in the border procedure if certain conditions are met, while still requiring an individual assessment. 

In addition, applications from citizenships with an EU-wide recognition rate of 20% or lower are, subject to limitations and exceptions, also channelled into the accelerated procedure and, where the applicant has not been authorised to enter, may fall under the mandatory border procedure. The accelerated procedure remains a full examination on the merits but operates under shorter deadlines; the border procedure forms part of the pre-entry phase and is intended to process applications considered likely to be unfounded or inadmissible more efficiently. 

The EUAA is providing operational and technical support to EU countries with the implementation of the new rules via its own Pact Programme. Information about specialised training on the Pact offered by the EUAA Academy, and available to Member States, is available in the European Asylum Curriculum. 

For more information read the EUAA Asylum report 2026, or watch the presentation. 
 

National migration policies often seek to limit irregular migration and facilitate returns, while at the same time EU institutions and several EU+ countries are pursuing more pragmatic approaches to address labour shortages and demographic decline. Ageing populations, shrinking workforces and pressure on pension systems increasingly influence migration policy, even where political rhetoric remains focused on deterrence and control.

At EU level, the Council approved the EU Talent Pool in March 2026, establishing the first EU-wide platform to connect employers in participating Member States with jobseekers living outside the EU. The initiative is intended to facilitate recruitment in occupations facing labour shortages and forms part of efforts to attract foreign workers via regular migration channels.

Spain adopted a particularly pragmatic approach by approving an extraordinary one-off regularisation process for migrants already living in the country since 2025 without secure status, including people involved in asylum procedures. By the end of the application period, around 1.17 million applications, mostly from Venezuelans, had been received. The measure does not allow beneficiaries to live and work in other EU+ countries but in Spain it provides access to residence and work permits and the social-security system. This approach adopted by the Spanish government clearly links labour-market participation to economic growth, social cohesion and the sustainability of public services and pensions as the population ages.

Italy provides another example of this dual approach. In May 2025, Italy and Bangladesh signed a Memorandum on Migration and Mobility combining stronger cooperation on irregular migration, returns and human trafficking with the promotion of legal labour migration. Italy has sought to expand regular-entry quotas and training-to-work pathways for Bangladeshi workers in response to labour shortages, while Bangladesh has advocated increased opportunities for skilled and semi-skilled workers. This is particularly relevant because Bangladeshis are simultaneously one of the largest asylum applicant groups in Italy and among the nationalities most frequently detected on the Central Mediterranean route. At the same time, Bangladeshi workers are already well established in sectors of the Italian economy including hospitality, retail and manufacturing, with particularly strong concentrations in parts of the shipbuilding industry.

The experience of people displaced from Ukraine provides further evidence of the economic effects of rapid access to employment, although outcomes vary considerably between countries. In Poland, Ukrainians established almost 39,000 businesses in 2022–2023, equivalent to around 7% of all new business registrations during that period. Their relatively rapid labour-market integration has been facilitated by geographic, cultural and linguistic proximity, although demographic pressures remain much larger than the contribution of any single migrant group can offset. In neighbouring Czechia, where the most Ukrainians per capita are hosted, the integration into the Czech labour market reached 66% at the beginning of 2026. 

Germany hosts the largest number of people displaced from Ukraine, but labour-market integration has generally been slower, with language acquisition remaining an important constraint. Employment has nevertheless increased with length of residence, illustrating how integration outcomes can improve over time even where initial barriers are greater.
 

Cooperation with partner countries remained a central component of the EU’s migration strategy in the first half of 2026, combining stronger border management, action against migrant smuggling, return and readmission arrangements, protection for refugees and host communities, and legal migration. The European Asylum and Migration Management Strategy, adopted in January 2026, places greater emphasis on migration diplomacy and a whole-of-route approach, including cooperation with partner countries on border management, migrant smuggling, protection, returns and legal pathways.

One of the most significant developments concerned returns. In June, the Council and the European Parliament reached a provisional agreement on common EU return rules intended to establish faster and more effective procedures for returning third-country nationals without a right to stay and to strengthen cooperation among Member States. The agreement would also allow Member States to establish return hubs in third countries, either as final destinations or as transfer centres facilitating onward return to a country of origin or another third country. Such arrangements may only be concluded with third countries respecting international human rights standards and international law, including the principle of non-refoulement, while unaccompanied minors are excluded.

In April 2026 the EU presented the first Action Plan under the Pact for the Mediterranean. Its security, preparedness and migration pillar includes measures to strengthen operational and institutional border-management capacity and implement a whole-of-route approach to migration. The approach seeks to address migration along routes through countries of origin and transit, while combating migrant smuggling and facilitating legal pathways. Counter-smuggling cooperation has also expanded through Anti-Smuggling Operational Partnerships with Morocco, Tunisia, Niger and the Western Balkans, involving partner-country authorities, EU Member States, EU agencies and EU funding. The European Commission reports that more than EUR 200 million is being invested in ongoing counter-smuggling projects covering around 25 partner countries across Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean.

In this context, the EUAA contributes to the external dimension of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) by supporting partner third countries in strengthening their asylum and reception systems and promoting protection-sensitive approaches to migration management.  The Agency's engagement is guided by the EUAA External Cooperation Strategy (2023), which aims to develop partnerships with partner third countries through effective, innovative, and rights-based cooperation.

EUAA currently cooperates with several partner third countries in different regions, both at bilateral and regional level. For example, cooperation with the Western Balkans continues through the EU-funded regional programme EU Regional Support to Protection-Sensitive Migration Management Systems in the Western Balkans, Phase III, implemented by EUAA, Frontex, IOM and UNHCR. The multi-country, multi-partner programme supports all six Western Balkan partners in strengthening migration and asylum systems in line with EU and international standards, including capacities related to asylum procedures, reception, returns and contingency planning. In 2026, partners also began preparing priorities for the programme’s next phase, covering 2027–2030. 

In Türkiye, cooperation is currently implemented under the fifth EUAA-Türkiye Roadmap, focusing on areas including international protection, temporary protection and resettlement. In the Southern Neighbourhood, the Agency continues to implement bilateral cooperation with Egypt under the EU's Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). Under the Regional Protection Project for the Southern Neighbourhood (RPSN), co-funded by Denmark, the EUAA provides support to Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania and Morocco, in cooperation with twelve EU Member States. Key areas of engagement include access to asylum procedures, reception systems, protection of vulnerable persons, appeals mechanisms, and the gradual development of sustainable national asylum systems.

Overall, EUAA's engagement is underpinned by a whole-of-route approach, recognising that effective asylum and migration management requires cooperation at both national and regional levels along migratory routes. 

Humanitarian funding continued to contract in 2026 despite persistently high displacement and protection needs. This followed a sharp funding deterioration in 2025, when UNHCR’s available funding fell by 25% compared with the previous year and returned to levels last seen around a decade earlier, despite the number of people requiring support having approximately doubled. 

The consequences were already substantial: UNHCR closed, merged or reduced operations in 185 of its 550 offices, more than 5,200 staff lost their jobs (a quarter of its global workforce) and up to 11.6 million displaced people lost, or were at risk of losing, direct protection and assistance as a result of these cuts. The effects were particularly visible in regions already facing renewed instability. At the end of June 2026, UNHCR operations were funded at only 17% in Iran, 21% in Lebanon and 28% in Afghanistan, while conflict and forced-return pressures were increasing across the region. These shortfalls constrained preparedness and response at the same time as large movements were taking place, including Afghan returns from Iran and Pakistan, and renewed displacement and return between Lebanon and Syria.

The contraction in humanitarian capacity has not yet emerged as a clearly measurable driver of higher asylum applications in the EU+. Nevertheless, this risk is particularly relevant in the context of Sudan: applications by Sudanese nationals have more than doubled over the past year, while UNHCR has warned that severe funding shortfalls are reducing essential assistance and protection for Sudanese refugees in neighbouring Chad. More broadly, reduced assistance, weaker registration and protection systems, and declining support for host communities may make displacement less sustainable and increase the likelihood of onward movement when new crises occur.

The escalation of hostilities involving Iran and Lebanon in the first half of 2026 generated substantial displacement in the region but did not produce increased applications in the EU+. 

According to IOM, some families in Iran had begun returning home by early August, although thousands remained displaced because of damage to housing and civilian infrastructure; overall, population movements remained localised and temporary, with no signs of mass displacement despite renewed regional tensions.  Nevertheless, between 1 March and 10 August, around 662,000 movements were recorded from Iran into Afghanistan, while around 38,000 movements into Pakistan were recorded to 9 August; overall, cross-border flows remained variable rather than showing a sustained increase. However, much of this cross-border mobility reflected return, transit, family visits, employment, business or precautionary travel rather than flight by Iranians displaced by the conflict and seeking protection.

By early July, UNHCR reported that most people temporarily relocated within Iran had returned to their areas of habitual residence. The conflict nevertheless had important secondary effects on displaced Afghans in Iran, with approximately 269,000 returns to Afghanistan recorded from the onset of the crisis to 4 July and deportations accounting for around four fifths of these movements.

Lebanon experienced a much larger and more immediate displacement shock. The scale of displacement was compounded by IDF operations south of the Litani River: in March, the IDF ordered civilians across UNIFIL’s area of operations to evacuate north of the river, an area of around 850 km² and home to hundreds of thousands of people. Israeli officials subsequently stated that the return of residents to the area south of the Litani would be restricted until the security of northern Israel was ensured, while Israel has described its continued presence in southern Lebanon as a security zone intended to counter the threat from Hezbollah.

By 6 August, around 353,000 people remained internally displaced in Lebanon, including around 26,000 in collective shelters, while 835,000 displaced people had returned. By 10 August, around 656,000 movements from Lebanon into Syria had been recorded by IOM, with Syrian nationals accounting for 98% of recorded movements and Lebanese nationals for the remaining 2%. According to UNHCR, these movements reflected both the displacement of Lebanese citizens and the repeated displacement of Syrians who had previously sought protection in Lebanon.

These developments demonstrate that major regional displacement does not always translate into asylum applications in the EU+. Displacements in the Middle East are so far dominated by internal displacement, temporary and circular mobility, return to neighbouring countries and repeated displacement among populations already living in exile.

The decline in EU+ asylum applications continued into the first half of 2026, extending the downward trend that began in late 2024. The most important component remained the exceptional fall in Syrian applications following the end of the Assad government in December 2024. Syrians accounted for around two fifths of the overall reduction among citizenships with declining applications in 2025, while substantial decreases among Turks, Colombians, Peruvians, Bangladeshis and Iraqis broadened the downward trend. 

The resulting caseload was therefore not simply smaller but differently composed. Afghan and Venezuelan applications remained high, while applications from Sudanese, Malians and Haitians increased and partially offset declines among previously prominent citizenships.

The decline has already provided some operational relief, with first instance pending cases falling from 986,000 at the end of 2024 to 770,000 at the end of June 2026. However, this reduction in pending cases probably resulted more from fewer incoming applications than from a general increase in processing capacity, while the overall caseload across all instances remained high because of cases awaiting decisions in appeals and review. 

At the same time, the decline may partly reflect changes in access to the EU rather than a proportionate reduction in underlying displacement pressure. The European Commission has linked lower irregular border crossings to strengthened external-border management and increased cooperation with countries of origin and transit. Meanwhile, major displacement crises remain unresolved. The war in Sudan continues to generate displacement into neighbouring countries, while renewed conflict in the Middle East displaced hundreds of thousands of people in Lebanon, even though this has so far translated into little additional asylum pressure in the EU+. Humanitarian and protection capacity is also contracting in several host settings. Taken together, these factors suggest that lower applications may reflect a combination of reduced irregular arrivals, changing routes and destination preferences, and changes in the underlying demand for protection.

EU+ asylum authorities enter 2026 with applications at a relative lull, underpinned by the sharp decline in Syrian claims, along with other decreases and the absence of new large-scale inflows. However, this breathing space rests on contingent developments rather than on any meaningful resolution of displacement drivers.

Shrinking workforces and demographic decline have begun to shape migration policy choices in some EU+ countries, even as political discourse favours restriction. Cooperation with countries of origin and departure may have contributed to fewer detections at the external border, while legal harmonisation temporarily reshaped protection demand within the EU+. At the same time, geopolitical volatility and dramatic budget cuts introduce new layers of uncertainty.

The decline observed in 2025 therefore reflects a temporary convergence of factors rather than a definitive turning point. A renewed escalation in conflict, regional destabilisation or systemic crisis could rapidly alter the trajectory of asylum applications in the EU+.

As the Pact enters into force, the EU+ seeks to institutionalise a more coordinated and controlled response to migration pressures. Its effectiveness will be tested against a backdrop of highly unpredictable geopolitical shifts and constrained humanitarian capacity. The only certainty heading into 2026 is that migration and asylum will remain central to EU policy and international cooperation in the year ahead.